

The President's Daily Brief

17 September 1969

Top Secret

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## FRANCE

A review of last week's meeting of Gaullist parliamentarians has led the Embassy to conclude that Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas are starting the new political season in relatively good shape on both the political and parliamentary scene. This assessment was borne out early this morning when Chaban-Delmas' policy statement before the National Assembly yesterday won a vote of confidence by 369 votes to 85 with eight abstentions. This is hardly surprising since the Gaullists hold a clear over-all majority and all of them but four abstainers voted for the motion as did the Independent Republicans and Centrists who have ministers in the government. The opposition came from the Socialists and Communists.

However, some hard battles will be fought over the next few months on the economic and social fronts where labor particularly may be harder to cope with than parliamentarians. The government's understanding of these problems was shown by the fact that the premier's statement yesterday was largely a critical appraisal of France's administrative, economic and social situation. He spoke of the "frailty" of the economy, the "defective working" of the state, and the "archaic and conservative" social structure and called for the building of a new society. At no time, however, did Chaban, Delmas attack General De Gaulle by name. The press quotes one deputy as commenting that the speech could have been made by opposition leaders Mitterand or Mendes-France.

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## COMMUNIST CHINA - SOVIET UNION

The Chinese can hardly be said to have cooled it since last week's meeting between Kosygin and Chou En-lai. Peking yesterday called attention to the possibility of an atomic attack launched by "social imperialism"--a clear allusion to recent public speculation concerning a possible Soviet preemptive strike against China. The statement, part of a slogan for this year's National Day celebrations on 1 October, is an unprecedented Chinese attempt to portray the USSR as

the aggressive party in the dispute. As such, it is likely only to further aggravate tensions between Moscow and Peking.

Meanwhile, the stream of standard anti-Soviet invective from Peking is continuing with no change in content or volume. On 14 September, for instance, New China News Agency publicized the showing in several foreign countries of a Chinese documentary depicting the "Atrocities of the New Tsars" along the border.

The Soviets' polemical stand-down is still in effect but is unlikely to continue much longer in the face of such outbursts.

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## Brazil

The consensus is that no immediate solution to the question of Costa e Silva's successor is in the offing. Yesterday was set aside for consultations within the three armed services and another meeting of their high commands is scheduled today. There is little optimism that agreement on one name will emerge from this meeting, however, as considerable negotiating and "politicking" are still going on. Still to be decided, also, are the questions of whether to convene Congress to legitimize the eventual decision and whether the man chosen should fulfill Costa e Silva's term plus one of his own or should merely finish out the present term. The army and air force are said to favor the long-term solution with an army four-star general to be chosen as successor but lack of agreement on a name may force the military to compromise on the stop-gap solution.


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